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Explaining the dog that does not bark:

Why do some localities in Turkey remain resistant to Islamist political mobilization?
Evren Celik Wiltse, South Dakota State University
Introduction:

(White, 2013; Tugal, 2015) focus on the periphery of the
largest metropolis, Istanbul – Umraniye and Sultanbeyli
respectively.

Most studies on political Islam in Turkey have embraced
a comprehensive, national level of analysis. From the
classic “center-periphery” paradigm (Mardin, 1973) to
recent works that explain the rise of political Islam (Gulalp,
2001; Arat, 2005; Turam, 2007; Gumuscu, 2010) or its
downfall (Tugal, 2015), scholars focus mostly on macro
transformations. These include socio-economic changes
since the 1980s, new state-society dynamics, the rise
of a “strong devout bourgeoisie” and successful bottom
up mobilization efforts of political Islam in large urban
centers. Few researchers (Turam, 2007; Tugal 2015) expand
their analysis to include the transnational outreach of the
Turkish Islamist experience.

Despite these compelling studies, an intriguing puzzle
remains: why do certain pockets of Turkey seem relatively
immune to the rising religious political wave?
This paper tries to explain the relative failure of Islamist
politics in certain localities of Turkey, with reference
to their distinct regional socio-cultural and economic
characteristics. As Marschall Shalaby and Konak Unal
demonstrate, local politics is not merely a venue for
redistributive policy. Issues of identity and morality
also play an important part, for they constrain “mayors’
ability to govern, manage conflict, and win elections.”
(Marschall, Shalaby and Konak Unal, 2017:2) Briefly, this
paper argues that having a distinct local socio-cultural
identity and certain economic means to sustain it can
make communities relatively immune to the inroads of
Islamist politics. Due to methodological and practical
complexities of accurately gauging the power of relatively
non-transparent Islamic movements, electoral support
for religious parties is used as a proxy in this paper. In
addition to election data, the paper utilizes qualitative data
from fieldwork conducted in Edirne and Kirklareli in the
northwest, and Hatay in south-central Turkey.

In terms of their methods, many of the studies that explain
political Islam in Turkey include key explanatory variables
on a national scale. The Turkish state’s rigidly secularist
disposition since the early Republic, effective mobilization
of Islamist movements/parties as a reaction to top-down
secularism, rise of conservative business networks since
the neoliberal tide of the 1980s, expansion of civil society,
urban marginalization, and women’s organizations all offer
excellent explanations for the strengthening of Islamist
movements and parties in Turkey.
While most of these studies successfully explain the rise
of Islamist movements, many of them are not particularly
sensitive to local variation and agency.1 Even ethnographic
studies that try to reach out to the marginalized sectors

Can a secular versus Muslim lens capture the whole
picture?
“At one level, Turkish society appears to be divided
into secular and Muslim positions whose proponents
are circling the wagons and demanding ideological
and behavioral purity from their members. But neither
term –secular or Muslim- does justice to the variety of
the possible positions and their sometimes surprising
combinations.” (White, 2013: 10)

For an example of research that is particularly sensitive to local
characteristics, see “Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in
Central Anatolia” by the European Stability Initiative http://www.
esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf Ironically, the local networks
and bonds of trust in Kayseri province that are much praised in this
report later became a serious liability. When the ruling AK Party and
its once closest ally, the Gulenist religious network, parted their ways,
businesses in Kayseri became targets and were overtaken by publicly
appointed trustees.
1
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After each election in Turkey, particularly since 2011, the
predominant interpretation seems to be the “polarization”
between modern, secular coastal cities against the
conservative, Muslim core. Consolidation of multiple
center-right and religious-right parties (ANAP, DYP, Genc,
and Refah) under the Justice & Development Party (AKP),
and left parties (DSP and CHP) under the Republican
People’s Party (CHP) helps breed this perception. Since
ultra-nationalists and Kurds are under constant existential
crisis due to the 10 percent electoral threshold, scholars
argue that Turkey has gradually replaced its chronic
electoral volatility with a dominant party system, wherein
the Islamist party takes the center stage and seculars
take the main opposition seat. (Carkoglu, 2011) While
Izmir symbolizes the stereotypical voter profile of the
secularists with its modern, educated and elite outlook,
places like Konya, Kayseri or Ümraniye symbolize the core
constituencies of the religious political bloc. This paper tries
to peel away some of these dichotomous assumptions about
the secular and religious voters, elites and counter-elites of
Turkey, by zooming in on three specific localities. (Map 1)

socially more parochial cities. In their region 45 percent
of women active in the labor force (ages 15 to 49) work
in the agricultural sector, which is 5 percent higher than
the national average. (TNSA 2008: 51) Given their large
rural populations that make a living from subsistence
agriculture, it is difficult to paint these localities as the hubs
of Turkey’s secular elites.
A third province included in this study is Hatay located
in south-central Turkey with Syria on one side and the
Mediterranean on the other. Hatay contains a medley of
cultures, religions, and ethnicities. Housing the historic
cities of Antakya (Antioch) and Iskenderun, Hatay prides
itself for being the “cradle of the three Abrahamic religions.”
It stands out for having Turkey’s only Armenian village,
Vakifli, located on the legendary Musa Dagh.(Eski, 2015)
Numerous holy sites of Islam and Christianity are scattered
across the province. In the old city center of Antakya, one
can see insignias on the facades of old stone houses that
display the profession and faith of the residents. This is
probably the only city in Turkey where one can hear church
bells ringing regularly during the daytime. Yet it is not a
typical secular/elite province such as Ankara, Izmir, or
Eskisehir either. Compared to these cities, Hatay is much
more religious and much less affluent. (see Table 1 below)

Both Edirne and Kirklareli in the northwest are known to
be historical strongholds of CHP. However, unlike other
CHP strongholds, such as cosmopolitan Izmir, Eskisehir, or
Ankara-Cankaya, boasting multiple universities, educated
and affluent upper-middle classes, Edirne and Kirklareli
are relatively small, economically less developed, and

When we look at the voting patterns of these three
provinces since 1991, we can observe certain variation that

Map 1: Administrative Units in Turkey

Source: www.d-maps.com
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sets them apart from national trends. Chart 1 displays the
support for religious parties, including the ruling AKP and
its predecessors. Despite the progressively increasing vote
share of the Islamist parties across Turkey, it shows that

these three provinces consistently rank below the national
average. Average support for the Islamist parties is about
4 percent lower in Hatay, and nearly 20 percent lower in
both Edirne and Kirklareli.

Table 1: Ranking of Turkey’s Provinces According to GDP per capita (2014)
1 İstanbul

21 EDIRNE*

41 Aydın

61 Malatya

2 Kocaeli

22 Kayseri

42 Amasya

62 Giresun

3 Ankara

23 Erzincan

43 Gaziantep

63 Ordu

4 Tekirdağ

24 Rize

44 Zonguldak

64 Tokat

5 Bilecik

25 Tunceli

45 Sivas

65 Ardahan

6 İzmir

26 Artvin

46 Afyon

66 Iğdır

7 Bolu

27 Balıkesir

47 Aksaray

67 Kilis

8 Bursa

28 Trabzon

48 Gümüşhane

68 Adıyaman

9 Antalya

29 Uşak

49 Kırşehir

69 Mardin

10 Eskişehir

30 İçel

50 Niğde

70 Bingöl

11 Yalova

31 Karabük

51 Bartın

71 Diyarbakır

12 KIRKLARELI*

32 Isparta

52 Çorum

72 Kars

13 Muğla

33 Konya

53 Sinop

73 Siirt

14 Çanakkale

34 Kastamonu

54 Elazığ

74 Bitlis

15 Denizli

35 Kütahya

55 HATAY*

75 Şırnak

16 Karaman

36 Kırıkkale

56 Yozgat

76 Muş

17 Manisa

37 Çankırı

57 Osmaniye

77 Batman

18 Sakarya

38 Adana

58 Kahramanmaraş

78 Hakkari

19 Düzce

39 Samsun

59 Erzurum

79 Van

20 Burdur

40 Nevşehir

60 Bayburt

80 Şanlıurfa
81 Ağrı

Source: TUIK. Calculated by the author based on Turkish Statistical Institute data on
GDP of each province and the population of each province for 2014.
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Chart 1: Percentage of AKP Votes in General Elections
in Edirne, Kirklareli and Hatay, 1991-2015:

and Hatay, which are full of small-scale merchants and
subsistence farmers. The majority of the population
in these provinces is far from being highly educated,
secular elites. In fact, both Trakya and Hatay are famous
for their fertile agricultural lands, and outside of a few
urban centers, there is also a significant portion of rural
population. Nearly half of economically active women
work in agriculture. The puzzle is: why would majority of
these less privileged, rural residents turn their backs to
the tangible benefits that come with a vote for the ruling
Islamist party? Why do they insist on voting for the secular
opposition?

Source: Compiled by the author from the Election
Archives of the Turkish Supreme Election Council (YSK)
www.ysk.gov.tr

Teune (1995: 14) argues that, “local structures and cultures
are less amenable to change than are higher levels of
political organization.” Constitutional amendments,
bureaucratic or economic reforms are much easier to
execute form the center, in comparison to breaking away
the “familiar dominance of political influence” in the
periphery. Consequently, we should not be too surprised to
see these provinces in the periphery resisting the Islamist
political wave that is impacting the metropolitan centers of
Turkey. The type of morality and identity politics in which
Islamist parties engage elsewhere, particularly in large
urban centers, might undermine their success in these
localities in the periphery of Turkey.

When we look at the support for the CHP, variation of
these three provinces becomes even more striking. All
three provinces score much higher than the national
average since 1991. On average, CHP receives 10 percent
more votes in Hatay, and around 14-15 percent more votes
in Edirne and Kirklareli.
Chart 2: Percentage of CHP Votes in General Elections
in Edirne, Kirklareli and Hatay, 1991-2015:

Religion is the crucial mortar that holds together the
social fabric in all three of these provinces. However, the
ways in which these communities incorporate religion are
not necessarily the same way as many political Islamists.
Compared to other parts of Turkey, religiosity in Trakya
stands out in several aspects. First and foremost, the
gender gap in Trakya is not as wide as the rest of the
nation. Women and men work in the fields together and
celebrate together in weddings and holidays. On average,
more than 35 percent of women in the region between the
ages of 15 and 49 are active members of the labor force as
of 2008, this is 5 percent higher than the Turkish national
average. (TNSA 2008) Marriage among relatives, including
distant cousins and even close neighbors, is strictly
forbidden. (Yedi kuşak akrabayla evlilik olmaz.) (Celik
Wiltse 2014-16) This social norm eases the tension among

Source: Compiled by the author from the Election
Archives of the Turkish Supreme Election Council (YSK)
www.ysk.gov.tr
Why swim against the tide?
The elite/secular center versus Islamist periphery template
does not explain the strong support for the opposition
CHP in small towns and villages of Edirne, Kirklareli,
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sexes, making socialization much easier since they do not
consider each other as potential spouses, or haram in all
contexts.

(particularly by Süleymancılar), tries to “purify” religion
from these backwards influences and seeks legitimacy in a
future, Islamist form of polity. (Hart, 2013: 153-4)

Unlike other parts of rural Turkey, strict public segregation
of sexes is neither practical, nor enforced in Trakya. Given
the low population density and record low birth rates,2 men
and women need to work side-by-side in the region. Women
can work alone as day laborers, without being shunned by
their communities. This relative gender parity also extends
into property rights. Turkish civil code grants equal share
of inheritance to all siblings, yet in most parts of Anatolia
brothers are favored over sisters. However in Trakya, my
respondents emphatically stated that all siblings get equal
share, regardless of gender. (Celik Wiltse 2014-16)

An overwhelming majority of rural Trakya probably
resembles the first village in Hart’s classification. They are
proud of their Ottoman heritage, and religious ceremonies
harken back to that golden era. (Hurriyet, 2016) Similar
to Hart’s villagers, “they share a patriotic dedication to the
nation-state, and an uncritical merging of Turkish ethnonational and Sunni Islamic identities.” (Hart, 2013: 23)
Patriotism and discretion towards national institutions
are noticeable in people’s daily habits as well. Across
Trakya, there seems to be greater reverence for the public
TV channels (TRT). The Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet) serves as the sole arbitrator on religious matters,
particularly among the middle aged and older generations.
In almost every house, there is a Diyanet calendar used
frequently as a reference, and most people tune in to
TRT for news and Ramadan programs. In personal
conversations, residents express reverence towards their
imam, a civil servant appointed by the Diyanet and are
decidedly negative about “outsiders” who come to preach
them about “their own religion.” (Celik Wiltse, 2014-16)
In sum, the pious rural population of Trakya adheres to
a more traditional form of religion, and the mainstream
Sunni interpretations of Diyanet, which repels the modern,
puritan interpretations that are frequently advocated by
Islamist movements. However, given “overtly political”
turn that Diyanet is taking, (Fabbe, 2016: 12-16) there
might be backlash or some lasting changes in the region.

Secondly, there is the unique way in which this devout
Sunni Muslim population practices its religion and
tradition. Complying with duties and transmitting them to
the next generations are important goals that shape day-today conduct. However, they also insist on practicing these
traditions the way their ancestors did, and react negatively
to external influences. (Atalarımızdan, dedelerimizden
gördüğümüz gibi ibadet ederiz.) (Celik Wiltse 2014-16)
In her impressive ethnographic work, Kimberly Hart
captures the clash between different ways in which
Islam can be experienced in any given community. The
unorthodox Islam takes the glorified Ottoman past as
its source of legitimacy, whereas the more modern and
politicized form of Islam looks at the future to establish
its ideal Islamic society. Hart compares and contrasts
two villages in western Turkey. The first adheres to more
traditional, heterodox practices, while the other one,
influenced by the Islamic movements and brotherhoods

The components of Hatay’s social fabric, and the ways
in which religion is incorporated into the social life
also serve as a salient barrier that, at a minimum, slows
down the penetration of Islamist political movements in
this province. Similar to Trakya, Hatay residents do not
automatically fit the elite/secular profile either. However,
while Trakya enjoys relative ethno-national and religious
homogeneity, the opposite quality in Hatay shapes the
social fabric of the province. Residents of Hatay pride
themselves for having harmonious relations for centuries,
despite their incredible ethnic, national, and religious
diversity. Many of its residents are fluent in Arabic.

Almost all surveys highlight low fertility rates in Trakya. TUIK data
on population density in 2016 shows that Edirne and Kirklareli have
nearly half the population density, compared to the Turkish average.
(TR average, 104; Edirne, 66; Kirklareli, 56). Edirne also scores negative
population growth in four of the last nine years that are recorded.
Hatay on the other hand shows robust expansion with double-digit
growth rates, and is one of the more densely populated provinces with
a density rating of 267 in 2016. (Turkey average: 104). TNSA -13 survey
results also show Trakya region having the highest rate (30%) of nuclear
families in Turkey without children. (Average for Turkey is 17.9%)
p.20. http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tnsa2013/rapor/TNSA2013_
ilerianaliz.pdf
2
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Intermarriage among Muslims and non-Muslims, as well
as among Sunnis and Alevis is not uncommon. People
talk about a “delicate balance” that has been historically
sustained in the region that enables each group to respect
each other and mutually thrive. (Celik Wiltse, 2016)

economically part of Iskenderun were cut off and linked to
the brand new administrative center of Arsuz, compelling
people to travel 30 kilometers for basic services. Finally,
Payas emerged arbitrarily, by dividing off the southern onethird of Dörtyol.

In terms of their socio-economic outlook, Antakya,
Iskenderun, Arsuz and Samandag all have vibrant
communities with strong tourism and service sectors,
renowned local cuisines, and a strong tradition of
entertainment. Even the ongoing civil war in neighboring
Syria does not seem to have dampened the nightlife
in many of these cities. Compared to its conservative
neighbors to the north, Hatay is more open, socially less
restrictive, and overall, more accommodating of diversity
and heterodoxy.

Map 2: Gerrymandering & its Impacts on
Constitutional Referendum in Hatay

Having established strong footholds in the region,
particularly in Gaziantep, Adiyaman and Urfa, the
ruling AKP has been consistently flexing its muscles in
Hatay, to gain electoral support. Many locals lament
that it tries to do so by rocking the “delicate balances”
in Hatay, and pitting the ethno-religious groups against
each other. For example, prominent CHP politician
and party spokesperson3 Selin Sayek Böke of Antakya
was systematically harassed for her Christian heritage.
(Haberturk, 2016) Locals state that in Hatay (population
1.5 million), most people knew the faith of their neighbors,
but it was considered vulgar to express it publicly, let alone
use it for political gain. However, since the AKP came to
power, they claim each election tested ethnic and religious
loyalties. (Celik Wiltse, 2016)

Map Authors: Dinesh Shrestha & Murat Keçeci, using
ArcGIS 10.3. software, South Dakota State University,
Department of Geography, September 2017.

After several electoral defeats, the AKP resorted to extreme
gerrymandering in Hatay. Three new municipalities were
created in 2012, separating neighborhoods and villages that
were consistently voting against the ruling party. According
to most locals, the lines were drawn almost exclusively
along sectarian lines, segregating the Alevis into separate
enclaves. Defne was separated from Antakya city center.
Neighborhoods that were long administratively and socio-

As the 2017 referendum results illustrate, elections
in Hatay remain a thorn in the side of the ruling AKP.
Gerrymandering transformed Hatay into an extremely
polarized province. In the 2017 referendum, Defne and
Samandag scored record high pro-CHP votes (with more
than 90 percent voting “no”), while Yayladagi and Altinozu
next door were staunch pro-government constituencies
(with over 70 percent voting yes). Despite these deliberate
attempts to segregate the population between Sunni

She quit her position as the party spokesperson over post-referendum
controversies within the party in Spring 2017.
3
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Turkmens and the rest, the AKP could not succeed in
winning the metropolitan municipality of Antakya. During
my interviews, local CHP leaders stated that collectively,
they decided to not play the “sectarian game” that the
AKP was trying to set up. (Celik Wiltse, 2016) The CHP
nominated an openly pious, Sunni candidate for Antakya
mayor, despite having its strongest electoral support from
majority Alevi districts. Yet they were able to beat the
heavyweight AKP candidate, Justice Minister Sadullah
Ergin in the 2014 local elections.

venues to project the predominant norms and identity
aspects of provincial communities.
Broad-brush explanations at the national level may not
capture the significant variations and identity dynamics at
the local level. Variables that may have strong explanatory
value at the national level may not be as pliable at a local
scale. This paper tried to illustrate that the average CHP
voter in rural Trakya, who is fasting during Ramadan and
probably saving money for a coveted visit to Mecca, is
very different from the average CHP voter in Izmir. In fact,
these two CHP voters might be very different from the
average CHP voter in Hatay, who probably speaks fluent
Arabic. In short, attention to local level politics offers
significant insights. It can unpack some of the dichotomous
ways of seeing Turkish electorate as monolithic progovernment Islamists in the heartland versus secular elites
along the coasts. Second, local dynamics can help explain
why, despite all their material perks and vast organizational
networks, Islamist movements cannot gain headway in
certain parts of the country. If localities have distinct sociocultural identities that are inhospitable to political Islam
and some economic means to resist the perks of patronage,
they may stay outside the Islamist sphere of influence,
despite the victory of Islamist politics at the national level.
Comparative studies of localities that have similar socioeconomic and identity characteristics but different voting
behavior can offer important puzzles for political analysts.

The ruling party has continued to liberally apply sectarian
pressure over Hatay. The recently established “village
guard” (korucu) positions, which come with a rifle, steady
paycheck and healthcare and retirement benefits, favor
only Sunni villages. Arab Alevis of Samandag express
growing sense of discrimination, especially in terms of
refugee settlements practices, since the outbreak of Syrian
civil war. Despite all the gerrymandering and sectarian
public policies, Islamist politics have made only partial
gains in the province. Local social dynamics and identities
matter greatly in smaller provinces of Turkey.
Conclusion:
Each province offers a densely rich palette of diversity
in Turkey. Even the most homogenous, nationalist areas
harbor variation in terms of ethno-nationalist heritage.
Migrants from the Balkans or the Caucasus, nomadic
Turkmens along the Mediterranean and settled Turkmens
of central Anatolia, the Azeris in the northeast, Kurds in the
southeast, and the Roma in the northwest all contribute to
complex socio-cultural dynamics at the local level. Islamist
movements in Turkey have to negotiate their way within
this medley of distinct communities and identities. While
some of these collective identities might be welcoming
towards Islamic movements and parties, others might form
effective barriers against them. How a group collectively
defines itself at the local level, and the predominant norms
and values they endorse, are important indicators of their
relative predisposition towards Islamic mobilization. The
works of Marschall et al (2017) clearly illustrate how local
governments in Turkey have increasingly become critical
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